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Resumo
O Imperativo Europeu de uma Nova Estratégia 
Global
No decurso de 2013 Estados-membros, analistas e 
decisores consideraram que o Conselho Europeu 
de dezembro passado deveria apelar à reflexão 
conjunta sobre a avaliação do ambiente global e 
o impacto dos desafios futuros reclamando a for-
mulação de uma nova estratégia global. A redis-
tribuição do poder global com o desvio dos EUA 
para a Ásia, o falhanço das intervenções no grande 
Médio Oriente e a crise financeira levaram a uma 
retração da Europa. Do mesmo modo, a vizinhança 
próxima da UE empobrecida e instável perdeu ca-
pacidade para lidar com a reemergência do mundo 
Vestefaliano. O recurso ao soft power e à ajuda fi-
nanceira afiguram-se como pouco eficazes perante 
parceiros internacionais não socializados com prá-
ticas de responsabilidade cosmopolita. No entanto, 
a propensão da UE para o consenso, compromisso 
e capacidade para definir a agenda internacional 
poderá adequar-se bem à transição do mundo 
hegemónico a uma nova distribuição de poderes, 
valores e interesses. Isto implicará uma nova forma 
de pensar estrategicamente o mundo, uma nova 
forma de projetar valores e repensar o papel das 
forças armadas.
Abstract
During 2013 member states, analysts and decision 
makers considered that December’s European Council 
should give the incentive to a common evaluation, re-
garding the global environment and the impact of futu-
re challenges claiming the formulation of a new global 
strategy. The new global power distribution, with the 
American shift to Asia, the failure of recent interven-
tions in the wider Middle East and the financial crisis, 
led Europe to inwardness. In Europe’s impoverish and 
unstable closer neighborhood, the EU lost the ability to 
deal with the re-emergent Westphalian world. The use 
of soft power and economical aid are of little effective-
ness towards international partners poorly socialized 
with the practice of cosmopolitan responsibility. Never-
theless, the European tendency to draw on consensus, 
compromise and ability to set the international agenda 
seem to adapt well to the transition to new hegemonies 
and power distribution. This will involve a new form 
of thinking the world strategically and to find ways to 
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In December 2013 the national leaders of the EU member states, meeting as the Eu-
ropean Council, held their first collective discussion on defence since the 2008 Fren-
ch Presidency. Their decisions on the Common Security and Defence Policy inclu-
ded the following, addressed to Catherine Ashton’s as-yet-unidentified successor: 
“The European Council invites the High Representative, in close cooperation with 
the Commission, to assess the impact of changes in the global environment, and 
to report to the Council in the course of 2015 on the challenges and opportunities 
arising for the Union, following consultations with the Member States.” (European 
Council, 2013).
A number of EU member states, led by Sweden and Poland and backed by a chorus 
of Parliamentarians, commentators and think-tankers, had pushed for this outco-
me, urging the case for the EU to formulate a new global strategy. In the event, the 
word ‘strategy’ is absent from the mandate. But this is probably a good thing: it 
will allow unproductive questions such as how a new strategy should relate to the 
2003 European Security Strategy - ESS (Council of the European Union, 2003), or 
the scope and weight of any final document, to be side-stepped. For what matters 
is the process, not the product: and what the European Council have done is open 
the door to a long overdue strategic reflection in Europe – a stocktake of where the 
world is headed, and of how Europeans must operate if they want to continue to be 
able to protect their interests and values.
For the mandate rightly makes assessment of global change the starting-point. The 
last decade has seen an unprecedented redistribution of global power, with the end 
of the post-Cold War Western hegemony and the arrival centre-stage of the ‘emer-
ging powers’. The US has responded with its ‘pivot to Asia’. The failed wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan have discredited liberal interventionism. The EU, pre-occupied 
with its own doubling in size from 15 to 28 member states, and then coping with its 
biggest economic crisis, has withdrawn into its shell. 
Nor is the pace of change likely to slow. “Global Trends 2030”, a publication of 
the US National Intelligence Council, contains a fascinating range of data and pre-
dictions.1 Similar future-gazing has been undertaken amongst the Brussels insti-
tutions.2 On current projections, China will by 2030 have overtaken the US as the 
world’s biggest economy – and may well have a bigger defence budget. China and 
India combined will have a greater economic weight than the G7. South-South 
trade will be approaching North-North. The global population will be around 8.5 
billion, with most of the continuing growth concentrated in Africa. 5 billion people 
will have access to mobile data – the global ‘middle class’ will be equally numerous, 
1  Available at http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/organization/national-intelligence-cou-
ncil-global-trends
2  See http://europa.eu/espas/
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and extreme poverty will have been largely eliminated. But demand for water, food 
and energy will have risen between 35 and 50%. As for the EU, its share of global 
GDP will have fallen from 28% to 18 or 17%; it will be importing 65% of its energy 
needs; and its aging population will account for only 6 out of every 100 people on 
the planet. European advantages in education and technology will be reducing. On 
all the conventional measures, Europe faces continuing relative decline.
The challenges thus implied are not hard to see. A resource-poor continent with 
expensive tastes (the cherished social model) and a shrinking, aging population 
will find it increasingly tough to earn its living. The Union is further handicapped 
by poor ‘team morale’ – a loss of confidence and mutual solidarity, and a caco-
phony of different views on both external policies and economics. Nor does it help 
to be adjacent to neighbours – Russia, the Middle East and North Africa – who are 
amongst those on the planet coping least well with globalisation. And, where the 
norms of the liberal international order that Europeans espouse were fifteen years 
ago unchallenged, authoritarian capitalism and a ‘neo-Westphalian’ approach to 
international relations is today gaining ground.
Perhaps, though, the biggest challenge is European complacency - a reluctance to 
take any of this on board. In a recent policy brief (Dennison, 2013), the European 
Council on Foreign Relations identified the key areas where Europeans urgently 
need to wake up and re-assess their comfortable but out-dated assumptions about 
handling the rest of the world. Recent events in Europe’s neighbourhood have – or 
should have – exploded the belief that Europe can rely on soft power and deep 
pockets to influence those around it; whilst developments at the UN and WTO 
should equally have brought home the realisation that the new powers are simply 
not going to be ‘socialised’ into becoming ‘responsible stakeholders’ in a Western-
designed international order. So future ‘multilateralism’ will have to involve enga-
ging with an altogether more complex and fluid set of (often regional) institutions 
and ad hoc coalitions than has been the EU’s traditional focus. 
Other sea-changes with which Europe needs to get to grips include the US strate-
gic reorientation and what it means for the transatlantic relationship; the growing 
security risks in Asia (an area Europeans still treat exclusively as a market and 
hoped-for source of investment); the souring of the Arab Spring; and the retreat of 
liberal interventionism at a time when, beyond the confines of our relatively safe 
continent, armed force seems to be reasserting itself in international affairs.
All this said, the necessary strategic stocktake should not reveal a wholly negative 
balance. Our lead may be slipping, but the EU can still draw on huge human and 
technological capital. For some years yet, our global market share should remain 
commanding; and even as others close in and overtake us, we should retain par-
ticular ‘long suits’ – in finance, professional services and administration, in aeros-
pace and other high-end manufacturing, in our armed forces.  Europe’s herbivo-
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rous image may invite bullying – but has its advantages too. And the endemic EU 
skills of compromise, coalition-building, and agenda-setting seem well adapted to 
a world of diffused power – especially when reinforced by the continent’s unique 
network of global connections. Even the diversity of our views and priorities could, 
if managed with discipline and self-restraint, be put to good use.
So the prospect of decline is mitigated by the assets and opportunity for some years 
yet to influence the organisation and behaviour of the evolving wider world – to 
shape the transition from Western hegemony to a more distributed power structure 
in ways that suit our values and interests. The challenge is to try to lock in our pre-
ferences whilst we still can. But to achieve this we will have to bring our assets to 
bear in an altogether more coherent and calculated fashion, starting with a funda-
mental rethink of all those regional policies -- towards our neighbourhood, Russia, 
the wider Middle East, China, and the rest of Asia -- which the last few years have 
exposed as self-deluding and ineffective.
At bottom what is needed is less an intellectual endeavour than a major attitudinal 
shift. Europe needs to shake off its introversion, and complacency. “It must wake 
up to the imperative of engaging with the outside world as more than a combi-
nation of merchant and Florence Nightingale” (Van Rompuy, 2014). It will need 
to recover the habit of strategic debate (whether on the implications of the US’s 
strategic reorientation, or non-proliferation, or Asian security, or half a dozen other 
neglected issues with potential to bear directly on the prosperity and security of 
Europe’s citizens); rethink how it can best propagate its values in a world where 
‘conditionality’ no longer works; and revisit the role of its armed forces. Above all 
it must overcome its fastidiousness about the concept of power, and reassess what 
it comprises in the unfolding global environment; how and why Europeans might 
wish to exercise it; and what they stand to lose if they do not maximise it.
The main threats to Europe today are not so much security-related (certainly, terro-
rism and cyber-attack need taking seriously – but, as our publics perceive, we are 
probably safer today in Europe than at any time in previous history) but stemming 
from our own attitudes: a comfortable readiness to acquiesce in decline, aspiring in 
Zbigniew Brzezinski’s phrase to become “the world’s most comfortable retirement 
home” (Brzezinski, 1998); a reluctance to bear the costs and risks of armed force, 
masquerading as a principled pacifism; and a lack of solidarity reflecting the temp-
tation in a number of capitals to believe they can still make it on their own.
In sum, whilst the necessary strategic stocktake must involve rethinking a number 
of outdated European policies, what is needed is less a new strategic recipe-book 
than a strategic repositioning. Europeans, particularly but not exclusively foreign 
and security policy elites need to absorb the reality of living in a declining region to 
which the world does not owe a living, and must therefore work harder to protect 
its interests and promote, not impose its values. The key is for Europeans to accept 
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the necessity to become more active, more capable and more coherent in how they 
address the world around them. This, of course, is exactly the conclusion of the 
2003 Security Strategy. So what is needed is not to replace that document, but to 
re-interpret its core principles for a transformed international environment – and 
then apply them.
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